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After a period of rapid growth and development, the financial system of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has now taken on global importance. The country's banking system is now the largest in the world, and its capital markets are rapidly approaching the size of those in the advanced economies. During this period of growth, the underlying structure of the financial system has evolved significantly. Previously characterized by a traditional banking model, the Chinese financial system has become much more complex over the past decade. A large and dynamic shadow banking system now plays an important role in the allocation of credit. These new developments have helped create a more market-based financial system, but they have also brought along new risks.
Over the past decade and a half, the Chinese financial system has progressed through many stages. The late 1990s and early 2000s were a period of important structural reforms following the nonperforming loan crisis. With the onset of the global financial crisis, financial reforms slowed and the government encouraged rapid credit growth to stimulate the economy. As a result, significant risks have accumulated within the financial system, which have the potential to threaten the entire economy. Aware of these growing risks, the new Chinese leadership has renewed its commitment to financial reform. A wide range of reforms, many of which have been policy goals for more than a decade, are now being implemented with a renewed sense of urgency.
Many of the existing problems in the financial system stem from the inconsistent policy priorities of financial regulators. Government intervention is excessive in some areas of the financial system and wholly insufficient in other areas. For example, while much of the rest of the economy has been opened to competition from private and foreign enterprises, the financial sector is still dominated by large stateowned institutions. Similarly, market-determined prices are the norm in most sectors, except in the financial sector, where the government carefully controls the cost and quantity of capital. At the same time, a shadow banking system has emerged over the past several years, bringing with it many risks, primarily due to insufficient regulation.
The path towards resolving these risks involves implementation of the financial liberalization agenda outlined in the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress in November 2013.
The reforms include establishing private financial institutions, expanding the capital markets, allowing market-determined interest rates, further opening the capital account, creating a deposit insurance system, allowing the market-based exit of failing financial institutions, and experimenting with mixed ownership reforms. However, without careful sequencing these same reforms could trigger many of the risks policymakers are seeking to avoid. For example, opening the capital account without addressing many of the underlying imbalances in the domestic financial system could increase the probability of a financial crisis. Financial reform must strike a balance between implementing reform and allowing incumbents sufficient time to adapt to the new system.
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Though the PRC's financial system is unique in size and structure, many of the challenges it faces are common in other Asian economies. State-owned financial institutions remain an important part of many Asian financial systems. The PRC's experience with restructuring and reforming its state-owned banks contains valuable insights for countries seeking to reform their own state banks. Additionally, lessons can be drawn from the PRC on the difficulty in rooting out moral hazard and addressing regulatory arbitrage occurring via the shadow banking system. These lessons may help other Asian policymakers avoid the pitfalls of financial reform.
RefoRms in the 1990s And 2000s
At the end of the 1990s, the Chinese financial system faced both international and domestic economic crises. Internationally, the Asian financial crisis was wreaking havoc on many of the PRC's economic partners, countries whose economic models PRC policymakers had consciously emulated. The Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and others faced attacks on their currencies and capital flight. The PRC's leaders recognized that absent structural reforms and improved regulation, the PRC would also be vulnerable to this type of international volatility (Zhou 2013) . Domestically, the Chinese financial system experienced a massive increase in the amount of nonperforming loans, primarily originating in inefficient state-owned borrowers. Dai Xianglong, who served as governor of the central bank during this period, declared in 1998 that 25 percent of total loans were nonperforming (Lardy 1998) . By the late 1990s, most of the major banks in the PRC were effectively bankrupt (Huang 1998) . Internal and external pressures had put the Chinese financial system in an extremely vulnerable position.
The response of Chinese policymakers to the accumulating risks in the financial system was dramatic.
In December 1997, the State Council released the Notice Concerning Deepening Financial Reform, Rectifying Financial Order and Preventing Financial Risk, which outlined the risks facing the financial system and set forth a plan for reform (Chinese Communist Party News and Documents 1997) . In a speech at a national financial work conference held shortly afterward, Premier Zhu Rongji identified excessive government interference in bank lending decisions, overheating in the real estate market, heavily indebted state-owned enterprises, unnecessary government investment projects, and misappropriation of bank funds as sources of the problems in the financial system (Zhu 2013) . Over the next several years, the premier would spearhead an ambitious financial restructuring program, which spanned a decade and required more than RMB4 trillion in financial commitments, an amount equivalent to half of the GDP at the beginning of the process in 1998.
The first phase of the reform was designed to fix the balance sheets of banks and improve their efficiency. In 1998, the Ministry of Finance issued a RMB270 billion bond, which was sold to the four big state-owned commercial banks. The funds raised from the bond issuance were then used to 4 significantly increase the capital base of the banks. At the same time, large state-owned banks initiated a restructuring campaign designed to increase efficiency and cut costs. Between 1998 and 2002, the banks laid off 556,000 employees and closed more than 40,000 branches (China Finance Society 1999 , 2003 .
In 1999, the government established four asset management companies to dispose of the nonperforming loans held by the large state-owned banks. The first round of bad asset disposal involved transferring RMB1.4 trillion in nonperforming loans, or 20 percent of the total loan balance. The nonperforming loans were transferred from the books of the banks to the newly created asset management companies at par value. As with the capital injections by the Ministry of Finance, the asset management companies were largely financed by selling bonds to the banks and then using those proceeds to purchase the bad loans. As a result of capital infusions, cost-cutting measures, and the disposal of bad assets, the financial situation of the banks improved rapidly.
The next phase of reform included a series of changes to the financial regulatory structure. In 2003, the State Council moved banking regulatory responsibility away from the People's Bank of China to the newly established China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The commission was tasked with monitoring and assessing risks in the banking system, protecting depositors, and formulating new supervisory rules and regulations. The government believed the creation of an independent banking regulator would be an improvement over delegating that responsibility to the central bank, which has numerous, and often conflicting, mandates set for it by the State Council. The government also reformed the ownership structure of the banks in 2003. Central Huijin, a government-owned holding company, was established to exercise the government's shareholder rights in the large state-owned commercial banks.
Creating a consolidated owner was designed to remove conflicts of interest between the ownership and operation of the banks. That year Huijin made a capital investment of $45 billion in China Construction Bank and Bank of China, acquiring almost all of their equity (Walter and Howie 2011) . A similar transaction was made in 2005 with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China for $15 billion and half of the bank's equity.
The final phase of the restructuring of banks was the corporatization and public listing of the major national banks. Between 2002 and 2006, foreign financial institutions were encouraged to make strategic investments in Chinese banks. These strategic partners helped establish modern corporate governance structures and implement international best practices for operations. They also contributed $17 billion in new capital in return for equity stakes in the banks (Leigh and Podoiera 2006) . After these internal reorganizations, the large state-owned commercial banks were listed on the stock exchanges in Hong Kong, China and Shanghai, raising $74 billion (Turner 2012) . In addition to raising new funds, an important benefit from the public listing was imposing greater disclosure and transparency on the banks as required by the exchanges and shareholders.
Response to the GlobAl finAnciAl cRisis
The onset of the global financial crisis precipitated a transformation in the PRC's financial development.
In the fall of 2008, the Chinese government approved a large stimulus to support the economy. Most of the stimulus was transmitted through the financial system through a large increase in the stock of credit. 2 Most of this increase in credit was in the form of bank loans, since commercial banks were encouraged to lend freely to stimulate investment. Another RMB2.5 trillion of credit was extended outside of traditional bank loans through products like entrusted loans, trust loans, banker's acceptances, and corporate bonds. The stimulus was quite successful in offsetting shortfalls in external demand. Fueled by cheap credit, the investment share of GDP increased from 42 percent in 2007 to 48 percent by 2010.
As a result, while much of the world fell into recession, the Chinese economy continued to grow rapidly, dipping to 9.2 percent in 2009 before accelerating to 10.4 percent in 2010. However, the financing of this investment became increasingly dependent on new credit. Figure 1 shows the sharp decline in the share of investment of nonfinancial corporations financed by the retained earnings. As a result of this shift, Chinese economic growth has become significantly more credit intensive. In March 2014, the CBRC accepted applications from five investor groups to establish private banks. The applications were accepted in two groups in July and September with the expectation that operations would begin in 2015. The scope of operations for these new banks will be more limited than that of traditional banks. Each bank will select a relatively narrow focus for its lending operations and will initially be confined to one preapproved test city. The primary motivation behind allowing the creation of fully private financial institutions is that they will be completely free from implicit guarantees by the government. With no government shareholders, these banks will be forced to bear full responsibility for any risks they take. Firms that fail will be forced to exit the market, currently a rare occurrence for financial firms. Policymakers believe applying this rule to these newly created banks, rather than the much larger existing banks, will provide a buffer against possible financial contagion from failing institutions.
Develop the Capital Markets. The expansion and development of capital markets are a major component of the Third Plenum financial reforms. The new reforms aim at improving access to financing for small and medium-sized firms, establishing a registration-based stock issuing system, and increasing the proportion of direct financing. Direct financing refers to financial transactions that occur through capital markets, such as stocks and bonds, rather than intermediated via banks. As figure 3 shows, the PRC's share of direct financing is well below that of advanced economies. Historically, this is quite natural since the share of direct finance typically increases as countries develop economically. However, 9. The next largest shareholder in these institutions is Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, which is the clearing house representing the shares floated in Hong Kong, China. These shares are owned by a mix of private and state-owned investors.
the Chinese share of direct finance is even lower than that of other emerging markets, such as India and Indonesia. The Chinese government has sought to increase the country's proportion of direct finance for more than a decade.
The PRC's capital markets are not especially small, even when compared with its enormous economy.
Measured by value of bonds outstanding, the Chinese bond market is now the world's third largest, and its corporate bond market is the largest in Asia. It accounts for 62 percent of the entire East Asian ex-Japan bond market (ADB 2014). The Shanghai stock exchange is currently the seventh largest in the world in terms of market capitalization and the fourth largest in terms of trading volume. Looking at combined market capitalization of all national exchanges, the PRC's equity markets are the second largest in the world, after those in the United States. A larger problem is that the capital markets allocate capital in a suboptimal manner, biased in favor of state-owned enterprises. The Chinese private sector accounts for two-thirds to three-quarters of all economic output. Yet private sector firms receive a disproportionately small share of capital market funding. In the corporate bond market, private enterprises account for only 10 percent of the total amount outstanding. The situation is only marginally better in the equity markets, where state-owned enterprises account for 70 percent of the market capitalization of listed A-share firms. Access to capital markets for private firms has been improving in recent years, but their share of financing is still well below their contribution to the overall economy.
Accelerate Interest Rate Liberalization. The Third Plenum reaffirmed the commitment of Chinese policymakers to liberalize interest rates. The process began almost two decades ago with the interbank rate (Li 2014) . Soon afterward, bond repurchase rates were liberalized and government bonds were offered via a bidding process. In the late 1990s, banks were allowed to make loans to certain classes of enterprises 10. For the PRC, this includes both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. See "China overtakes Japan in stock market cap," Financial Times, November 27, 2014, www.ft.com/intl/fastft/242222/china-overtake-japan-stock-market-cap (accessed on January 25, 2015).
11. Other institutions include organizations that are not classified as corporations, such as hospitals and schools. The number of strictly enterprise loans was 45 trillion renminbi.
at multiples of the benchmark interest rate. Deposit rates remained subject to a ceiling imposed by the central bank. In the mid-2000s, the upper limit on the lending rate was removed. In 2012, some flexibility was granted for deposit rates, allowing banks to pay a rate of interest that was 1.1 times the benchmark rate. In 2013, the lending rate was fully liberalized, removing any downward rate restrictions.
Also in 2013, banks were permitted to issue large-scale negotiable certificates of deposit in the interbank market. In 2014, the flexibility around the benchmark deposit rate was increased from 1.1 times to 1.2 times.
The PRC has made substantial progress on interest rate liberalization over the past two decades.
However, financial repression remains a significant problem. Figure 4 shows that throughout most of the last decade, Chinese real deposit rates have been at or near zero. The low rate on deposits filters through to low lending rates, which have been strikingly low in the PRC compared with other Asian nations. Figure   5 shows that between 2007 and 2013, the average real lending rate in the PRC was 1.8 percent, around half the average real lending rate for Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and India during the same period. The low lending rate in the PRC is one of the driving factors behind the credit and investment boom and the regulatory arbitrage that occurs via the shadow banking system.
Move towards a Market-Based Exchange Rate.
Mirroring the progress on interest rate liberalization, the renminbi exchange rate has been on a long and uneven path towards liberalization. In 1994, the PRC merged its dual-track exchange rate system to a unified regime and implemented a tightly managed float versus the dollar (Yi 2013) . Beginning in the mid-2000s, the intervention required to keep the exchange rate from appreciating more rapidly led to the massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Even with these measures, the share of Chinese financial assets available for purchase by foreigners is extremely small. At the end of 2013 the total amount of offshore renminbi liquidity was $300 billion to $400 billion (Anderson 2014) . The total amount of QFII and RQFII assets was equivalent to $82 billion during the same period. In its initial phase, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect program has an aggregate quota of RMB300 billion ($49 billion) once it is fully utilized. Combined, these amounts are well below 10 percent of 2013 GDP. For comparison, foreign ownership of US financial assets is in excess of 100 percent of GDP.
Establish a Deposit Insurance Scheme. As with many of the reform priorities outlined in the Third Plenum, the establishment of a deposit insurance scheme in the PRC has been on the policy agenda for more than a decade (World Bank 2013). Despite having the largest banking system in the world, the PRC has lacked this basic safety net for depositors, which all other major financial systems have established.
In place of a formal deposit insurance scheme, the government has provided an implicit guarantee to deposit-taking financial institutions of all sizes. Many factors have delayed the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme. Various potential regulators have disagreed over who will be granted authority over funds collected and leadership over resolution of failing banks. Additionally, banks have been reluctant to pay additional insurance premiums, and smaller banks have objected to paying higher rates based on risk. These obstacles have finally been surmounted, and the State Council released a draft proposal for the system at the end of 2014. The new scheme will include a new deposit insurance agency and will cover deposits up to RMB500,000 per account. Implementation of the deposit insurance system is likely to begin sometime during 2015.
Creation example, has sold a 30 percent stake in its distribution business to a consortium of private businesses.
Sinopharm Group and China National Building Material Group are also considering partial privatization.
At the local level, Shanghai and Guangdong have taken the lead on implementing the mixed ownership reform. Guangdong has a stated target of putting 80 percent of its local state-owned enterprises into mixed ownership reform by 2020. The first major financial institution to explore the mixed ownership reform is the Bank of Communications (BoCom). In July 2014, BoCom announced that it was studying the feasibility of deepening its existing mixed ownership structure and improving its corporate governance system. In September 2014, the bank's management began to buy significant numbers of shares using their own personal funds. The next stage of reform may include increasing employee ownership and reducing the number of shares held by the Ministry of Finance, which currently stands at 26 percent of total shares. If BoCom's experiment with mixed ownership advances, many other banks will likely follow suit.
sequencinG And Risk mAnAGement
Financial reform is a risky process that often exacerbates the very problems it is seeking to address.
There is a strong tendency for banking and currency crises to follow financial liberalization (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999 ). Yet, there are also dangers from inaction. Delaying financial reforms can allow the buildup of imbalances and the misallocation of capital, both of which can significantly impede growth and create financial crises. Successful implementation of the financial reforms outlined in the Third Plenum will therefore require careful sequencing to minimize the potential risks.
International experience shows that it is critical to address domestic financial weaknesses and imbalances before opening up the financial system to foreign capital inflows and outflows (Chalk and Syed 2013) . International capital flows tend to be volatile, and policymakers lose much of their ability to influence these flows once capital controls are abandoned. Without effective regulation, domestic banks often borrow heavily from foreign lenders. Negative shocks to the economy can spark capital flight and lead to a disorderly deleveraging of the financial system. This was one of the key triggers of the Asian financial crisis. In the PRC, external debt levels, both official and private, are currently relatively low. Yet if barriers are lowered, existing distortions in the domestic financial system could encourage disruptive capital flows in both directions. An undervalued exchange rate will encourage hot money to flow into the country and exacerbate existing asset price bubbles. If deposit interest rates remain artificially low, savings may flee the domestic banking system in search of higher returns. Smaller banks, which generally have weaker deposit bases, would be hit especially hard. These potentially volatile inflows and outflows could destabilize the entire financial system. Thus it is incumbent on policymakers to address these underlying domestic distortions before opening the capital account.
There are three main priorities for reforming the domestic financial system. The first priority is ending the systematic underpricing of capital. Resolving this distortion and moving towards a more marketdetermined interest rate requires eliminating the deposit ceiling. After liberalization, large deposits, money market rates, short-term bond rates, and small deposit rates are all likely to increase (He, Wang, and Yu 2014) . This increase in the cost of funding will, in turn, lead to higher borrowing rates. Faced with higher funding costs, many borrowers and projects will be less creditworthy. Banks, which have become increasingly profit-oriented following the restructuring of the 2000s, are likely to allocate an increasing share of their lending to more efficient borrowers. This will improve the allocation of capital while offsetting some of the negative impact of a slowdown in credit growth (Borst 2014 ).
The People's Bank of China has outlined a sensible framework for deposit interest rate liberalization based on three principles. First, interest rates on foreign currency deposits will be liberalized before renminbi deposits. Second, long-term deposits will be liberalized before short-term deposits. Third, large-scale deposits will be liberalized before small-scale deposits. 13 The logic behind this sequence is that the more stable and secure types of deposits will be liberalized first. This gives banks adequate time to adapt to a change in their business environment and gain experience with more volatile interest rates.
However, despite having this framework for a decade, implementation has been slow. Only rates on largescale foreign currency deposits have been fully liberalized. 14 Financial institutions are permitted to issue large-scale domestic currency negotiable certificates of deposits in the interbank market, but that right is only slowly being extended to corporates. The vast majority of bank deposits remain subject to the same controls that existed a decade ago.
The reason deposit interest rate liberalization has progressed so slowly is the fear that fully liberalized rates could lead to unhealthy competition for deposits among banks. Competition for deposits is frequently a trigger for financial distress because banks promise unsustainably high rates to hold onto funds. In an attempt to generate the income to pay these higher deposits rates, banks often lend to riskier borrowers at high yields. Inevitably many of these loans go bad and force some banks into failure, ultimately imposing losses on depositors. If this type of deposit competition took hold, especially among the smaller and regional banks, the Chinese government would face large contingent liabilities given its implicit guarantee for all deposits in the banking system. To prevent this, regulators seek to implement a formal deposit insurance scheme that would remove the implicit guarantee in favor of a formal system with measures to discipline riskier banks. The establishment of a deposit insurance system is therefore seen as a prerequisite for moving forward more aggressively with deposit rate liberalization. The delay in the creation of the deposit insurance system has thus stymied the larger project of interest rate liberalization.
With the draft proposal for a new deposit insurance system now released, this obstacle may be removed.
The second priority for domestic reform is capital market development. Expanding the PRC's capital markets is an important step in the sequencing of financial liberalization for two principal reasons. First, capital markets can help reduce the degree of moral hazard in the currently bank-dominated financial system. The bank restructuring in the late 1990s and 2000s confirmed the government's willingness to offer substantial aid to failing banks, both small and large. As long as most banks remain predominantly state-owned, which is likely for the foreseeable future, some level of implicit government support will be assumed. This leads to the problem of moral hazard for both the management and nonstate shareholders of these banks. Banks that are too big to fail have incentives to take on additional risks because they know that the government will save them. Strong regulation can help control these risks but it cannot alter the underlying incentives at play. Increasing the share of credit allocated through the capital markets will reduce the role of the banks in the financial system. However, moral hazard will decline only if regulators reduce state involvement in the capital markets. Intervention to prevent bond defaults and heavy restrictions placed on companies seeking initial public offerings have impaired market discipline in the capital markets.
The second benefit from developing the PRC's capital markets is their potential to improve the allocation of capital. As mentioned above, in their current form the PRC's capital markets do not appear to be better at allocating financial resources than banks. State-owned enterprises continue to occupy an outsized position as borrowers in the capital markets, which is completely disproportionate to their share of economic output and inconsistent with their very low returns compared with private firms. 15 Part of this is the result of the current structure of the economy. In general, state-owned enterprises tend to be larger and better established than private enterprises in the PRC. Therefore, it is easier for these firms to undertake the costs and regulatory requirements of issuing securities. However, much of the bias towards state-owned enterprises is also explained by government policy. Until 2000, the PRC had a quota system for stock listings (Lardy 2014) . Under the quota system, the State Planning Commission, government ministries, and local governments mostly selected state-owned enterprises for listing. These trends have improved in recent years, but this historical bias continues to distort the makeup of the equity markets. Despite what appear to be easier requirements for issuance, private firms have struggled to make inroads into this market thus far.
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The third major component of the sequencing of domestic financial reform involves establishing a market-based exchange rate and creating a more effective framework for monetary policy. Ending routine intervention in the foreign exchange market is necessary for the establishment of a market-determined exchange rate. 17 A market-determined exchange rate, in turn, will help improve the conduct of monetary policy. Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People's Bank of China, publicly declared in November 15. In the industrial sector, the gap between the returns of private and state firms is close to 3:1. The return on assets of private firms was almost 15 percent versus less than 5 percent for state firms. The ratio for the service sector is 2:1 (Lardy 2014, 97-99) . 18. The PRC's required reserve ratio is extraordinarily high. The ratio is 20 percent for large banks and 18 percent for small and medium-sized banks. In 2014 authorities made a small cut in the ratio, 0.5 percent, for banks that had met a certain threshold for loans to small and rural borrowers.
19. FDI into sectors which are labeled "encouraged" or "permitted" in the investment catalogue no longer require approval from the central or local NDRC if the amount is less than $300 million. For outward investments, this threshold is set to $1 billion. most circumstances. However, despite these improvements many barriers to inbound direct investment remain. Many foreign investments are still subject to a complex web of approval requirements from local and central authorities. Moreover, much of the service sector and some strategic areas of the industrial sector remain off-limits to foreign investment. The new Chinese leadership appears to be committed to addressing these issues. It recently agreed to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty with the United States on the basis of a negative list approach to investment approval. 20 This will potentially remove many of the remaining restrictions on investment. Continuation of these trends towards full liberalization of inward and outward direct investment is unlikely to cause financial instability.
Relaxing rules on portfolio investment and cross-border borrowing is more complicated. With respect to portfolio investment, institutional investors tend to have a longer-term perspective and therefore play a stabilizing role in financial markets. Portfolio investment for institutional investors is already partially liberalized, but the overall amounts of portfolio investment are strictly controlled via the QFII, RQFII, and QDII programs. These quotas have increased rapidly over the past several years, with the QFII quota now almost six times larger than it was at the beginning of 2008. However, the quotas' overall size relative to the total financial market is insignificant. Encouraging growth of portfolio inflows and outflows will require expanding the quota amounts, continuing to ease the process of qualification for a quota, and removing restrictions on the type of securities that can be held. Once foreign institutional investors have a greater presence in the PRC's securities markets, policymakers should increase investment opportunities for retail investors. Full and unrestricted portfolio investment by foreign retail investors should be considered only as a final step.
The cross-border activities of Chinese banks have grown steadily, but overall the financial system remains domestically focused. Between January 2011 and June 2014, the stock of foreign assets held by Chinese banks increased by 73 percent. However, because of rapid growth of the financial system during this period, the share of foreign assets remained virtually unchanged at 2.1 percent of total assets. Foreign liabilities are also minimal, equaling 1.5 percent of total banking liabilities during the same period. Figure   8 shows the share of the "other investments" component of the PRC's international investment position, which includes cross-border lending, trade credits, foreign currency, and deposits, relative to GDP. The figure reveals a significant decline in cross-border activity during the global financial crisis followed by a recovery in recent years. In comparison to many developed economies, these numbers remain quite low.
For example, at the end of 2013, other investment assets and liabilities relative to GDP for Japan were equal to 37 and 40 percent, respectively. 20. A negative list approach means that areas not specifically prohibited to investment will be open. In contrast, a positive list approach requires approvals for areas not specifically listed.
As the capital account opens, it is likely that Chinese banks will further increase their cross-border activities. Greater openness will increase competition within the domestic banking system, forcing
Chinese banks to become more efficient or lose market share to foreign competitors. Loosening restrictions on cross-border lending can also help Chinese banks diversify their range of borrowers and transform themselves into true multinational banks. However, increasing banking openness is not without risks. Reliance on foreign funding, particularly short-term wholesale funding markets, can turn into an acute financial risk during periods of financial distress (Jeanne 2014) . Currently, the overwhelming domestic focus of Chinese banks means that this type of dependence is unlikely to occur in the near term, even if restrictions are eased. If Chinese regulators maintain strong prudential standards, this risk can be avoided, and increasing the share of cross-border banking activity can be a net positive for the financial system.
Overall, the priorities for the sequencing of financial reform are clear. Policymakers should first strengthen the domestic financial system by simultaneously implementing three broad reforms. First, distortions to interest rates, primarily in the form of the ceiling on deposits rates, should be eliminated.
Second, financial deepening should be promoted by expanding the PRC's capital markets. Third, the exchange rate should become market-determined, freeing up the PRC's central bank to concentrate on domestic economic management. Once these prerequisites are in place, policymakers can move forward with opening the capital account, gradually removing restrictions on portfolio investing and overseas borrowing and lending.
lessons foR otheR AsiAn countRies
Drawing lessons for the rest of Asia from the PRC's experience is difficult given the unique characteristics of the country's financial system. The Chinese financial system is set apart by having grown to a very large size, relative to GDP, at an early stage in economic development. Figure 9 plots out the stock of credit, measured as borrowing by households and nonfinancial enterprises, relative to GDP and per capita GDP, a proxy for level of economic development. The PRC stands out in terms of having a stock of credit relative to GDP that is comparable to that of the Republic of Korea and Japan, yet having a much lower level of per capita income. In general, as countries grow richer they undergo financial deepening, that is, the size and complexity of the financial system increase. East Asian economies tend to have particularly large financial systems at an earlier stage of development. 21 However, the PRC is an outlier even in this group with a stock of credit much larger than that of Malaysia and Thailand, two countries at similar levels of economic development.
21. Much of this can be attributed to extremely high saving and investment rates in East Asia.
The large size of the Chinese financial system is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, the PRC may have been even more of an outlier in the past. In the early 1990s, the PRC's credit-to-GDP ratio was already near 100 percent at a time when per capita income levels were much lower. The roots of this can be traced back to the old model of the financial system in which the State Planning Commission and the central bank set lending targets and priorities for each of the banks. Facing soft budget constraints and easy access to credit, state-owned enterprises borrowed heavily during the 1980s and 1990s, inflating the size of the PRC's financial system. The other unique factor contributing to the size of the Chinese financial system is the financing of fiscal expenses through the banking system. Originally state-owned enterprises borrowed from banks to provide education, housing, and health care to workers and their families. More recently, the banking system has financed a spree of infrastructure projects through lending to local governmentlinked platform companies. If the government had financed these projects through more traditional borrowing methods, such as issuing bonds, explicit government debt levels would have been larger and the amount of corporate debt smaller.
In addition to size, the other distinguishing feature of the Chinese financial system is its bias towards serving corporate rather than household borrowers. Figure 10 shows the credit outstanding, relative to GDP, to both the corporate and household sectors. The skew in the direction of lending to companies is related to the relatively recent emergence of a private housing market in the PRC. Household borrowing is dominated by mortgage loans, with consumption and auto loans still accounting for a very small percentage of borrowing. In recent years, however, households are increasingly gaining access to financing.
The share of new lending going to households increased to 42 percent in 2013, up from 14 percent in 2006. Regardless, even if these trends persist the Chinese financial system will be unusually dominated by corporate borrowing for many years to come.
Despite these differences, Asian economies implementing financial reform can draw several useful lessons from the Chinese experience. The first lesson is that it is possible to rapidly improve the efficiency of state-owned banks. The PRC's banks went from being technically bankrupt in the late 1990s to earning large profits less than a decade later. The turnaround initially required a large injection of capital from the central government and indirect support to offload bad loans to asset management companies. However, the reforms went farther than a simple bailout. State-owned banks dramatically reduced their employee and branch numbers to boost efficiency. An independent banking regulator was established and a separate body was created to manage the state's ownership interests. Chinese banks also brought in foreign strategic investors and listed on international exchanges to reinforce corporate governance improvements. These reforms dramatically increased the operational efficiency and profitability of the PRC's commercial banks, in part due to increased lending to private firms, which generate higher returns, and reduced lending 20 to state-owned firms, which on average earn substantially less on their assets (Lardy 2014 ). 22 Table 1 shows that dramatic improvement in the performance of Chinese banks since the banking cleanup in the late 1990s. The table also shows that Chinese banks meet or exceed the performance of their G-20 counterparts on a variety of performance metrics.
State-owned banks are prevalent across many Asian countries. Figure 11 shows that in many financial systems state-owned banks account for more than 20 percent of total banking assets. These banks are often inefficient and in need of reform. In the process of cleaning up their banks, Chinese regulators undertook unusually large and dramatic interventions. Though other banking regulators may not have the need or desire to make such herculean efforts, the basic principles of the PRC's banking cleanup are transferable across borders. These lessons include reducing waste and inefficiency, establishing a banking regulator with a clear mandate, separating ownership and regulation, and bringing in international experience and scrutiny. Of course, there are inherent problems associated with maintaining a large role for state-owned banks in the financial system. Therefore, reforming state-owned banks as the PRC has done may be only a second-best solution to overall financial sector reform.
The second lesson to be drawn from the Chinese financial reform experience is that incrementalism can lead to unintended consequences. The big bang approach to financial reforms advocated to many developing countries in the 1990s was soundly rejected by Chinese authorities. In the wake of the economic collapse of many post-Soviet countries and the turmoil in Asia during the Asian financial crisis, the Chinese approach of slow and incremental financial reform seemed vindicated. However, the slow progress of many financial reforms, most notably liberalization of interest rates on deposits and exchange rate reform, has created adverse side effects. The glacial pace of interest rate liberalization has increased credit to unsustainable levels and created a large shadow banking system. On the deposit side, wealth management and trust products have proliferated as savers seek alternatives to artificially low bank deposit rates. On the lending side, low interest rates have led to excessive investment and regulatory arbitrage by banks to extend credit to borrowers. This created a boom in finance products like entrusted loans, trust loans, and bankers' acceptances. With respect to the exchange rate, policymakers' desire to maintain an undervalued exchange rate required the central bank to intervene on an unprecedented scale. As a result, drastic measures were imposed on the domestic banking system to prevent inflation. Measured and incremental financial reform may be preferable to overnight liberalization. However, lack of reform can also create risks within the financial system.
The final lesson from the experience of the PRC is the difficulty of rooting out implicit guarantees and moral hazard in a financial system dominated by state-owned actors. The PRC has the largest banking 22 . It should be noted, however, that significant concerns exist with respect to the off-balance sheet activities of Chinese banks. Investors' calculation that these activities may ultimately lead to losses for the banks mean that Chinese bank stocks often trade below their book value.
system in the world, yet it has lacked the modern prerequisite of deposit insurance and is only now in the process of creating a deposit insurance system. The Chinese central government therefore has an implicit liability for more than RMB100 trillion in deposits, almost twice the PRC's GDP. Even worse, depositors assume that banks will make them whole for a variety of other financial products, such as trust and wealth management products, irrespective of whether the issuing bank has a legal responsibility to do so. The central government is therefore the ultimate guarantor of these products as well. In the capital markets, regulators have been reluctant to let market forces play out. Regulators manipulate stock prices by instructing state-owned enterprises to buy stocks on market dips and by restricting new offerings, primarily to bolster existing prices. Corporate bonds, dominated by state-owned enterprises, rarely go into default due to extensive work by the government behind the scenes to provide support to failing firms.
These government actions distort the financial system by short-circuiting the price discovery mechanism and encouraging excessive risk taking. Without a paradigm change in the approach of regulators and the introduction of private financial institutions capable of failing, these problems seem destined to persist. B a n g l a d e s h B h u t a n I n d i a I n d o n e s i a K a z a k h s t a n R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a K y r g y z R e p u b l i c P a k i s t a n P h i l i p p i n e s T a i p e i , C h i n a T a j i k i s t a n T h a i l a n d
